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Abstract
Scholarly literature is inconclusive on how economic crises impact on minimum
income protection. Earlier studies found small increases in the generosity of
safety nets at the onset of the crisis. Yet an increased focus on budget austerity
substantially altered the social policy context. This paper assesses how minimum income
floors weathered the austerity tide following the crisis using purpose-collected data for
23 EU countries. Generally, social assistance benefit trends did not deviate much from
pre-crisis growth levels. Yet retrenchment did occur through more technical measures,
the combined impact of which was quite significant in some countries.
Jel codes: I380
Keywords: Minimum income schemes, Crisis measures, Reforms, EU member states,
Social floor
1 Introduction
This article looks at what 23 EU countries undertook in the crucial area of minimum
income protection (MIP) for able-bodied persons at working age during the first 5 years
of what Jenkins et al. (2013) have dubbed the ‘Great Recession’, with a particular focus
on the period when austerity started to take hold. This article follows up on Marchal
et al. (2014a), in which we assessed how MIP schemes weathered the onset and initial
phase of the crisis. That article started from the observation that just prior to the crisis
social safety nets were not in the best of shape in Europe. Minimum income provisions
had by and large deteriorated during the two decades preceding the crisis, as social
policy in many EU countries had come to rest on the idea that work offered the
best way out of poverty. Suddenly confronted with unemployment levels not seen
in a generation, the relevance of adequate protection arrangements acquired a new
level of significance.
We did find evidence of efforts to raise the social floor right after the onset of the
crisis, a finding also confirmed for other fields of the welfare state (see, e.g. Marchal
et al. 2014a; Clasen et al. 2012; Gauthier 2010; International Labour Organization, World
Bank 2012; Isik-Dikmelik 2012; Vis et al. 2011). Yet the size of these increases did not
point towards a sea change in MIP policies. All in all, these first supportive measures
seemed relatively short-lived, as additional efforts became rarer from the end of 2009
onwards. Meanwhile, soaring national debts had harsh impacts on countries’ finances
and their position on financial markets. A hesitant recovery proved short-lived, a
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double-dip recession ensued and EU countries were confronted with prolonged low, or
in some cases negative growth rates. Countries that had to apply for financial support
had to follow stringent austerity trajectories. Also elsewhere, European governments
were concerned with reducing debts and deficits while EU budgetary control strength-
ened, through the Excessive Deficit and Macro-Economic Imbalances Procedures.
In this paper, we focus on what happened to MIP in the later stage of the crisis, as
the austerity tide washed over Europe. In Marchal et al. (2014a), we hypothesized that
the changes for the better would be short-lived, as budget austerity was already loom-
ing on the horizon. Here, we test that conjecture. This research question is relevant in
its own right as social indicators show a continuing need for income replacement and
protection benefits (Eurostat 2015). MIP schemes, in the shape of means-tested social
assistance benefits, play a key role in preventing severe financial hardship when mar-
kets fail and when social security rights are not available, inadequate or depleted. In
addition, we know little about changes to MIP schemes and—more generally—social
floors. Whereas some authors consider these schemes to be more prone to retrench-
ment due to their vulnerable target group (Korpi and Palme 1998; Nelson 2007), others
hold that given their small budgetary impact and enormous social relevance, social
floors will be relatively untouched (Pierson 1994, 1996). Interestingly, this latter pos-
ition seems to be confirmed by some of the major players within austerity-ridden
Europe: the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (European
Commission 2008; International Monetary Fund 2012).
The extended time frame of this paper (until 2012, 5 years into the crisis) as well as
the relatively large number of countries included (23 EU countries) allow us to assess
how MIP fared after the initial crisis shock wore off. We focus explicitly on minimum
income schemes, an area that arguably offers a clear indication of the changes at the
floor of the welfare state. Moreover, the declined generosity of unemployment insur-
ance arrangements (Clasen and Clegg 2011) and the surge in nonstandard work may
have increased the potential significance of minimum income schemes (Immervoll
2012). We build on purpose-collected policy data, capturing in a systematic way and in
significant detail policy changes in the area of MIP as these affect generosity, accessibil-
ity and obligations.
In the next section, we provide a brief overview of the existing literature on crisis
measures and social policy change, particularly in the area of MIP. The third section
presents the data on which this paper is based and the analytical framework used. We
proceed by presenting the measures taken in the countries of our sample and assessing
these measures in a cross-temporal and cross-sectional light. Next, we discuss the over-
all pattern of crisis responses and assess whether some countries distinguish themselves
by the type of measures they have enacted. Finally, we conclude.
2 Theory: crisis pressures and crisis constraints
This paper sets out to assess changes to MIP taken in the immediate aftermath of the
crisis and the austerity years that followed. In the two decades prior to the crisis, mini-
mum income provisions had by and large eroded. By the start of the crisis, minimum
income provisions were largely inadequate in nearly all EU Member States (Van
Mechelen and Marchal 2013). Confronted with soaring unemployment levels, the rele-
vance of adequate protection arrangements acquired a new level of significance and
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urgency. The crisis abruptly changed the context which had allowed policy makers to
either neglect or ‘activate’ minimum income schemes over the preceding decades. Also,
it critically undermined the notion that well-functioning labour markets could be relied
on to provide adequate incomes for all those capable and willing to work.
Yet the literature is not clear on the effects of crisis on social protection, and MIP in
particular.
The compensation hypothesis holds that as demand for social protection increases in
times of crisis, more resources will be directed towards adequate protection (Shahidi
2015). Indeed, empirical studies confirm that in the wake of the crisis, discretionary
support was ubiquitous: countries initially turned towards Keynesian measures in the
immediate aftermath of the crisis (Marchal et al. 2014a; Vis et al. 2011; Chung and
Thewissen 2011). The European Commission and the IMF advocated fiscal stimuli and
explicitly mentioned income support as a valid crisis strategy, as increases in transfers
to the poor were deemed more likely to feed through in aggregate demand (European
Commission 2008; Spilimbergo et al. 2008). In addition, Dolls et al. (2012) argue that
discretionary support was relatively more substantial in countries where social protec-
tion was less well developed to start with.
Yet the challenges posed by the crisis varied greatly across Europe and over time.
The crisis morphed from a financial crisis into a recession and then a fiscal crisis be-
tween 2007 and 2010, afterwards culminated in a Eurozone crisis (Hemerijck 2012)
and, for some states, a crisis of the welfare state (Gough 2011). In a review of initial
labour market policy responses in six countries, Clasen et al. (2012) stress that reac-
tions were enacted in two phases. Initially, labour market policy was used to cushion
the effects of the crisis on labour markets and workers, albeit with varying intensity.
Then, generally from 2010 onwards, fiscal concerns came to the fore, although, again,
to a varying extent in the six countries of their analysis. It is worth noting, however,
that governments were faced with multiple challenges from the start, competing to
some extent for attention and financial resources. Cost containment concerns must
have played an important role even during these first years although there was not yet
the acute pressure from financial markets which took centre-stage after mid-2010. In-
deed, there can be little doubt that austerity later became the main theme, as it became
clear that a double-dip scenario was unfolding and a prolonged period of low growth
and by implication budgetary restraint would ensue. That is not to say that austerity hit
the continent in equal measure. The initial effect of the crisis had been varied, but pub-
lic finances were also in much better shape in some countries as opposed to others
(Farnsworth and Irving 2011).
The impact of this austerity shift in more recent years is unclear. Some authors posit
that small, residual schemes will survive austerity rounds relatively unscathed, given
their small impact on general expenses and important social consequences (Pierson
1994). Alternatively, Korpi and Palme (1998) point towards the importance of political
alliances in protecting income replacement schemes from retrenchment. In this regard,
social floors are especially vulnerable, as there are no clear organized interest group al-
liances protecting MIP provisions.
It is therefore interesting to ask how austerity might have affected minimum income
schemes in particular. These schemes act as a crucial final safety net against poverty
but in budgetary terms their cost is relatively limited. Countries typically only spend a
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small percentage of GDP on final safety net provisions. Outlays on social insurance,
education and health generally dwarf outlays on social assistance. Moreover, the institu-
tions making up the infamous Troika, particularly the IMF, strongly favour ‘cost-effi-
cient’ means-tested benefits, over more expensive social insurance, let alone universal
provisions. It is not unthinkable that even in a context of austerity, and especially in
countries under Troika pressure, social assistance was strengthened, possibly at the cost
of spending on other social items, or elsewhere. A 2012 IMF Country Report on Greece
did not mince words (International Monetary Fund 2012, pp. 19–20):
Left unreformed, social benefit settings could also contribute to high reservation
wages, frustrating efforts to move workers out of unemployment spells. In this
context, the authorities are to identify 1–2 percent of GDP in additional savings,
with the focus on discontinuing non-essential programs and improving the targeting
of core programs. The largest potential savings would be possible through replacing
most existing programs with a single, income-tested minimum income scheme
targeted at the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution (with presumptive
income also used to control for evasion)
However, while strongly targeted means-tested social safety nets make up a relatively
small portion of government spending and play a key role as a protection against ex-
treme poverty, there is a political science literature line arguing that such programs are
particularly vulnerable to governments under cost cutting pressures because they gen-
erally cater to particular, fragmented sections of the electorate, far removed from the
all-powerful median voter (Korpi 1980; Korpi and Palme 1998). Programs most in dan-
ger of retrenchment are those where interests are least organized or articulated, as op-
posed to say social insurance programs with stable constituencies represented by
powerful stakeholders, for example trade unions. By contrast, the populations living on
social assistance tend to be fluid and geographically fragmented.
Finally, in a context of a prolonged collapse in labour demand, governments may be-
come more strongly concerned about additional inflows into the system which not only
bring additional pressures on tight budgets, but also the risk of chronic dependency
and scarring further down the line.
3 Data and analytical framework
3.1 Data
In this paper, we track changes to MIP in the aftermath of the crisis. We take a broad
approach to MIP: we look at the combination of benefits that guarantee the absolute
social floor in each country in order to compare functional equivalent income protec-
tion benefit packages. Minimum income benefits are beyond doubt the most important
component, but a substantial number of countries complement minimum income ben-
efits with cost-compensating benefits, such as housing or heating allowances and child
benefits.
To this end, this paper builds on the CSB-MIPI dataset, an expert-sourced dataset
that covers in detail the institutional arrangements relating to different MIP schemes.
The present paper focuses on the MIP arrangements catering for able-bodied un-
employed falling outside the scope of the insurance scheme. Information is available
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for 23 EU countries,1 since 2001. The data set includes annual time series on gross ben-
efits as well as detailed model family simulations that grasp the interplay of various
schemes and measures in providing a minimum income package to various types of
households.2 It furthermore includes information on activity requirements for mini-
mum income recipients. Most importantly for our present purposes, the 2010 and 2012
waves inquired after policy changes impacting on the minimum income benefit pack-
ages that were implemented since the onset of the crisis, gathering information on the
crisis measures taken in the period 2008–January 2012. The data is provided by na-
tional experts on the basis of detailed questionnaires and instructions. Many have par-
ticipated in earlier studies on social benefit packages (Bradshaw and Finch 2002;
Eardley et al. 1996), or currently participate in EUROMOD. More information on the
methodology and content of CSB-MIPI, as well as a list of the national experts contrib-
uting to this data set, can be found in Van Mechelen et al. (2011).
By first defining the group at risk (here the working-aged able-bodied who fall out-
side the social insurance scheme and are without a job), equivalent schemes are com-
pared across countries, instead of schemes that merely have a similar name. In most
European countries, this target group is catered for by the general final safety net, i.e.
the minimum income scheme that provides support to all those who have passed the
means test. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Finland and Hungary however,
this target group receives support from a categorical income support scheme (see Bahle
et al. 2011). 3 In Austria (until September 2010), Italy and Spain, the minimum income
scheme is a subnational responsibility, whereas in Sweden municipalities have a large
degree of autonomy. CSB-MIPI contains information for respectively the localities
Vienna, Milan, Catalonia and Stockholm.
CSB-MIPI includes policy changes that impacted on the net disposable income of
minimum income recipients, i.e. it includes changes in additional support if minimum
income beneficiaries are entitled, even when this additional support is provided through
a different scheme, as well as conditions tied to minimum income receipt implemented
in the period 2008–start 2012. Ideally, we would focus on those measures taken in
response to the crisis (see Marchal et al. 2014a). However, as the period under consid-
eration is quite large, the distinction between measures that are driven by the crisis, are
adjustments to a changed socio-economic context or would have been enacted anyhow,
becomes more and more blurred. Therefore, this paper provides an overview of
changes enacted since the onset of the crisis that were relevant for households relying
on minimum income benefits. The focus is on policy changes that require actual
intervention. For instance, regular uprating of the benefit based on an indexation
mechanism is not included in the overview. In order to provide an overview as
complete as possible, measures provided by the CSB-MIPI respondents were cross-
checked with the OECD Benefits and Wages series (OECD 2011), the ILO/World
Bank Inventory of policy responses to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008
(ILO/World Bank 2012) and MISSOC (2013). Where possible, we indicate in the
main text where measures are especially unlikely to have been related to the crisis
context, as per assessment of the respondent or evidence of a clear preparation before
the onset of the crisis (and implemented without further modification or reference to
the crisis) in secondary sources. This distinction is however more robust for the first
crisis years.
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An important consideration is that various authors have forcefully argued that
retrenchment measures are more likely to occur through less visible administrative or
technical adaptations, or even through non-intervention, in order to raise less resist-
ance (Pierson 1996). In the context of MIP, this may occur through non-interventions
such as skipping indexation, or small, technical changes such as tinkering with eligibil-
ity parameters.
Our time series of gross minimum income benefits allow gauging nominal increases
or standstills. We also compare trends in gross benefits to more substantively relevant
denominators like prices and average wages. These, however, are influenced by other
factors than policy alone.
Changing access and behavioural conditions generally require explicit legal changes,
although these are often of a rather technical nature. The data employed in this paper
allow in principle to capture such changes. Also in this field, creeping retrenchment is
possible by not adjusting nominal eligibility thresholds. This kind of retrenchment is
harder to gauge, and the data employed in this paper may fail to fully take account of
this. When there is a link between the benefit levels on the one hand, and the eligibility
thresholds on the other, creeping retrenchment in benefit levels may also point towards
a tightening of access.
3.2 Analytical framework: assessing changes
We structure our assessment in line with the framework we adopted in Marchal et al.
(2014a). Following Yerkes and Van der Veen (2011), we assess changes in the field of
MIP from a social citizenship perspective. This perspective allows for a rather nuanced
assessment of different dimensions of MIP that are relevant for its beneficiaries.
Social citizenship is constituted by social rights and obligations (Kvist 2007; Marshall
1950). According to Kvist (2007), social rights are manifested through different configu-
rations of benefit characteristics, i.e. generosity of benefits and eligibility criteria. The
generosity of benefits refers to the legally guaranteed benefit levels, whereas the eligibil-
ity criteria define the pool of persons who may access the benefit. Obvious examples of
eligibility criteria are nationality and residence requirements and means tests. However,
the shift of social policy measures towards activation has by now been extensively doc-
umented (Aurich 2011; Marchal and Van Mechelen 2014b; Immervoll 2012; Kenworthy
2010; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008). Obligations or behavioural requirements of benefi-
ciaries to ensure continued benefit receipt have been strengthened and made more explicit
and should therefore be taken into account when assessing changes in social citizenship.
Table 1 shows our operationalization of each of these dimensions. Two important ca-
veats apply. First, we do not include the value of in-kind benefits and (free) services to
which minimum income recipients may have access. Quantifying such measures is
fraught with difficulties. First, provision is often only guaranteed at the local level, lead-
ing to large intra-national differences in presence and level. Second, their face value de-
pends heavily on actual use that is determined by the specific characteristics of each
beneficiary unit. Third, some of these measures are only discretionarily awarded, there-
fore not matching with a rights-based perspective.
Second, a problem that is especially relevant for assessing the conditionality of bene-
fits is how to treat possible (and probable) discrepancies between implementation and
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regulation (Clasen and Clegg 2007). Here, the focus is on statutory rights and
obligations.
In this paper, we monitor legislative changes to any of these dimensions in order to
assess how minimum income floors have shifted during the “age of austerity”. In
addition, we assess the combined impact of these legislative changes on the net dispos-
able income for the aforementioned family types. This allows assessing the effects of
the interplay of changes in generosity and access (at least to the extent the underlying
assumptions of the simulations allow for detecting changes in eligibility criteria).
In line with other crisis literature, we assess whether these changes are merely para-
metric changes to minimum income provision, or whether they point towards a struc-
tural change. Are the institutional characteristics of MIP changed in such a way that its
impact will likely be felt for years to come, on multiple dimensions and changing the
underlying logic of the scheme, or do we mainly see tinkering at the margins?
4 Changing minimum income protection schemes
4.1 Crisis measures affecting minimum income recipients
This section aims to provide an overview, as complete as possible, of the different mea-
sures that impacted on the situation of social assistance beneficiaries. We identify mea-
sures or changes as relevant, as they impact on one or more of the dimensions of social
citizenship (generosity, access and behavioural conditionality) guaranteed to minimum
income beneficiaries.
4.1.1 Benefit generosity
4.1.1.1 Gross minimum income benefit levels In the pre-crisis period, nominal gross
benefits generally increased, as most countries (either or not automatically) adjust gross
benefits levels for price rises at regular intervals (Van Mechelen 2013). There are only a
few exceptions (Ireland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and the Slovak Republic).
However, in most of these countries, governments did in fact issue periodic increases
in the years before the crisis. Significant nominal decreases of gross benefit rates were
rare and occurred only in the Czech and the Slovak Republic. Both were part of far-
reaching reforms of the social safety net.
Table 1 Operationalization of the dimensions of social citizenship
Rights Obligations
Generosity Accessibility Conditions for benefit receipt
Trends in gross and net benefit
levels (nominal, real, % average
wage)
Description of policy measures impacting
on access/eligibility conditions (including
time limits) to minimum income benefits
and other income components
Description of policy measures
impacting on the conditions
for benefit receipt
Crisis has also impacted on the
denominators
Trends in net benefit packages
Comparison with previous
trends in benefits allows to
assess hidden retrenchment
Description of first round crisis
measures impacting on other
income components
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During the first crisis year(s), nominal growth rates did not slow down (see Fig. 1). In
2008–2009 (coinciding with the brunt of fiscal stimulus programs), benefit levels in fact
increased, in over half of the countries of our sample, exceeding the average increases
during the pre-crisis period.
Growth rates decelerated and even halted later on in the crisis. This is especially the
case in those countries without indexation mechanism. However, a substantial number
of countries also skipped indexation (see Table 2). In some cases, this was a conse-
quence of low inflation, especially in Sweden and Finland. In the latter country, skip-
ping indexation in 2010 actually meant a real increase of benefit levels. Moreover,
Finland subsequently implemented a substantial raise in minimum income benefits. In
Germany, low inflation triggered in 2010 a ‘Schutzklausel’ that protects certain benefits
from a nominal decrease when inflation is negative. Yet in other countries skipping in-
dexation should be understood as an austerity measure. This was the case in Romania,
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Portugal and Spain. Moreover, in a number of countries,
indexation mechanisms changed, leading to a (presumably) less generous indexation,
for instance in Germany and the United Kingdom in 2011. An exceptional development
occurred in Ireland, where minimum income benefits were actually cut by around 4 %.
Also in Portugal, the gross benefit for a couple decreased, as part of a far-reaching
reform of the minimum income scheme. In Italy (Milan), minimum income benefits
depend on the available budget and on social workers’ assessment of the situation. As
the crisis gained foothold, the (estimated) actually awarded benefit amounts decreased.
Finally, Hungary cut base rates by 20 %. It should be noted that similar nominal
decreases were rather exceptional in the years before the crisis.
Many of the nominal increases observed in the first crisis years translate in substan-
tial real hikes in most countries. This is partially due to the lagged reaction of index-
ation mechanisms to in some cases quite substantial pre-crisis increases in consumer
prices. Yet these automatic increases were further reinforced by additional increases of
gross benefits in a substantial number of countries (see Table 2). Later on, the deceler-
ation in nominal growth or the outright skipping of indexation led in some countries
Fig. 1 Average trend in gross social assistance benefit for a couple, EU27, 2004 = 100. Note: time series
for Cyprus, Malta, Hungary and Bulgaria were not available. Greece does not have a minimum income
protection scheme for able-bodied persons of working age. Source: CSB-MIPI Version 3/2013 (see Van
Mechelen 2011); OECD (2014)
Marchal et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:4 Page 8 of 20
to a small loss in purchasing power. However, bar a few exceptions (most importantly
Ireland and Portugal), this decrease does not appear exceptional when compared to
pre-crisis trends.
Also relative to average wages, there are no indications for an erosion of benefit levels
during the first crisis years, rather the reverse is true. Whereas benefit levels eroded
relative to average wages in more than half of the countries in our sample in the years
before the crisis, a further erosion of benefits remained very limited in 2008–2009. In
line with the deceleration of nominal growth levels, relative benefits did decrease in the
majority of countries after 2009, but this erosion remained mostly in line with pre-
crisis annual changes.
All in all, trends in gross social assistance benefit levels prior and during the crisis
provide no indications for a retrenchment round immediately after the crisis. Later de-
velopments are mainly back in line with pre-crisis trends, with the exception of coun-
tries like Portugal and Ireland where gross benefits for a couple have quite substantially
decreased.
4.1.1.2 Supplementary allowances and child benefits Minimum income recipients
often receive on top of their social assistance benefit child cash benefits and supple-
mentary allowances such as housing or heating allowances, one-off emergency pay-
ments etc. To the extent that these additional benefits are not included in the means
test, measures impacting on these income components do affect the generosity of the
minimum income package, in a few cases even quite substantially.
In Marchal et al. (2014a), we showed that quite a few countries raised the net income
of minimum income protection beneficiaries through (a combination of) these add-
itional income components. Some examples include increases of the child benefits or
the child-related element in minimum income benefits and crisis-specific supplements
in the first years of the crisis (see Table 2).
Additional positive measures become rare as the crisis continues. Reinforcements of
the minimum income scheme or child benefits are often no longer (presented as) re-
lated to the crisis, but part of reforms prepared before the onset of the crisis (such as





2008 IE LT ATcb BEcb LTcb PTcb UKcb ROcb,heat BEcb LT
2009 BE BG DE HUR IE LV
NO RO US





2010 ATR LVcap FIix ATcc FIoth UKcb BGheat FImip,act FR ATR RO
2011 BE DE EE SE CZha FIcb UKcb BGheat BG DE
Start
2012
CZ DE FI LTR PL SIR CZha FIoth BGheat LTR
Changes in heating allowance are indicated in italics. Often, these benefits depend on type of heating and will be
provided in kind. However, sometimes parameters for access may be tied to gross benefits. DK, LU: n.a. Source: CSB-MIPI
Version 3/2013 (Van Mechelen 2011)
cb child-related measure, heat heating allowance, ha housing allowance, oth other, R reform of minimum income scheme,
mip minimum income protection, cap benefit cap, ix indexation
aOnly mentioned where respondent notes actual change
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in Austria); increases following a more prudent policy in the crisis years (Finland,
Estonia) or combined with more negative measures, leading to rather mixed effects.
For instance, the Slovenian as well as the Lithuanian social assistance reform has got
varying effects on different family types, due to changes in equivalence rates. Likewise,
the increase in the Austrian child care benefit was coupled to tougher access condi-
tions. Similarly, in the UK, a continued uprating of the child element of the child tax
credit was combined with decreases in other elements of this tax credit.
The prevalence of measures that have a (potentially) negative effect on minimum in-
come recipients follows the inverse pattern: whereas negative measures are relatively
rare in the first crisis years, they become more and more common as the crisis con-
tinues. This is most straightforwardly seen in the change from additional increases of
gross minimum income protection benefits in 2009 to the skipping of indexation in a
number of countries from 2010 onwards. Also changes in additional allowances indi-
cate that countries implement more measures with a negative impact on minimum in-
come recipients as the crisis advances. In the first crisis years, the only countries
negatively impacting on certain income components are Estonia and Latvia. Yet, in
2010, both Ireland and Portugal decrease child-related benefits. In Ireland, the 10 % cut
is partially compensated for low income groups. This is however no longer the case
when the child benefit is again targeted by cuts in 2011 and 2012. Also in Austria and
the UK, child-related payments are reduced. In Hungary, the gas and heating allowance
is abolished. One year after it limits access to the social allowance to families with a
handicapped child, the Czech Republic completely abolishes this benefit in 2012. In
both Italy (Milan) and the UK, the housing allowance scheme became less generous. In
the UK, tax credits once again decreased. In Slovenia, it was decided that the
indexation of all benefits bar social assistance, would be halted for one and a half year.
Moreover, reforms of the minimum income scheme implemented in the later crisis
years often have mixed effects. Table 4 shortly describes the main points of the various
reforms implemented since the onset of the crisis (up until 2012).
4.1.2 Access to benefits
Whereas the generosity of benefits initially increased, Table 2 shows that rules deter-
mining access to minimum income schemes and related benefits remained relatively
unchanged during the first crisis years.
From 2010 onwards, only Finland and Lithuania introduce measures that are (to
some extent) crisis related and that increase access to minimum income or related ben-
efits. In France, the group of persons eligible for minimum income benefits is extended
to persons younger than 25 (yet depending on a prior work history) for equity reasons,
whereas the Austrian reform renders access criteria more comparable across the
Länder. Bulgaria abolishes its time limit within the minimum income scheme in order
to bring its legislation in line with the European social charter. In contrast, quite some
countries start to reduce access to benefits from 2010 onwards, and often this decision
was driven by financial considerations. Examples include the social allowance of the
Czech Republic that was from 2011 onwards only awarded to families with a handi-
capped child, the 2010 Portuguese reform that tightened the means test for minimum
income protection and the introduction of a 5-year life time limit for social assistance
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in Spain (Catalonia) in 2012. In addition, one should have lived in Catalonia for 2 years,
before being eligible.
All in all, access criteria are more often negatively adjusted than the other way round,
especially if we focus on crisis measures. This (as well as the changes in gross benefits
that skip indexation or adapt indexation mechanisms and equivalence scales) seems to
be in line with the literature on retrenchment, that predicts that unpopular measures
will generally be hidden behind rather technical measures, or distinguish between vari-
ous small groups.
4.1.3 Obligations: behavioural conditionality
In Marchal et al. (2014a), we noted the striking absence of crisis-related changes re-
garding the activity requirements imposed on minimum income protection beneficiar-
ies in the first crisis years. Also later on, changes to activity requirements were
generally not framed as crisis measures. Some exceptions include the reforms in
Portugal and the Netherlands that increased conditionality (see Table 4) and were
(partly) driven by budgetary concerns.
Yet this is not to say that the conditionality of minimum income benefits did not
change in the period 2008–2012 (see Tables 2 and 3). However, changes were generally
implementations of measures prepared before the onset of the crisis, part of broader
policy changes or reforms, or not framed as crisis measures. In Marchal et al. (2014a),
we describe the change that occurred in France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Hungary and the Czech Republic in 2008 and 2009. Later on—and quite exceptional-
ly—sanctions for German beneficiaries for minor infringements (such as missing an ap-
pointment) were somewhat relaxed. Information on whether or not this was influenced
by the crisis is lacking. The United Kingdom continued to roll out a previously decided
on measure to gradually move lone parents from income support towards the jobsee-
kers allowance, where they may be faced with tougher activity requirements. Other
measures that were implemented, but of which respondents doubt any influence by the
crisis are a small increase in the severity of activation-related sanctions in Austria, an
increased work requirement and sanctions for mistakes in reporting in Bulgaria,
harsher requirements in Finland, increased work requirements in Hungary, more
Table 3 Countries introducing measures with a negative effect on dimensions of social citizenship
Generosity Accessa Conditionality
Minimum income benefit Additional allowances
2008 BG FR UK
2009 CZ PLix EEcb LVcb BGheat LTcb,b LV HUheat,b FRR HUR NL UK
2010 IE IT PTR ROix SIix SKix IEcb PTcb HU LTcb,b PTR ATcc,b
IEcb
AT BG FI PTR RO
UK
2011 DEix EScap IE PTix ROix SEix SKix
UKix
ATcb IEcb UKcb HUheat ATcb CZcb ROmip,heat,b BG HU SI
Start
2012
ESix HU IT LTR PTix ROR SIR SKix
NL
CZcb IEcb ITha SIoth
UKha,cb
ITha RO SIR ES LV NLR UK
Changes in heating allowance are indicated in italics.
DK, LU: n.a. Source: CSB-MIPI Version 3/2013 (Van Mechelen 2011)
cb child-related measure, heat heating allowance, ha housing allowance, oth other, R reform of minimum income scheme,
mip minimum income protection, cap benefit cap, ix indexation
aOnly mentioned where respondent notes actual change
bActual impact on minimum income recipients depends on specific situation and interaction with means test for
minimum income protection. Changes to the income threshold/means test for the particular benefit mentioned
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checks of willingness to work in Romania and a tighter suitable employment definition
in Slovenia. Also in Slovenia, the 2012 reform introduced activation allowances to mini-
mum income recipients in part time jobs.4 Generally, these changes were introduced by
referring to the need for activation, and in some cases by a commitment to reducing
social fraud.
4.2 Mixed effects on net income packages
Figure 2 shows the trends in the simulated net disposable income packages of four
hypothetical families from mid-2009 to January 2012.5 This period does not entirely
coincide with the changes described above nor can standard simulations capture the
impact in changes to activity requirements or access conditions. However, as some
measures have mixed effects on different types of families, or on different income
components, these simulations do provide a more nuanced understanding of trends in
overall income packages. In addition, they take account of the diverse impact of the
different measures on the final net disposable income.
By far the largest overall nominal decreases are observed in Hungary, Italy, Portugal,
Ireland, and, to a more limited extent, in Romania and Lithuania. This mainly reflects
the changes these countries introduced to their minimum income schemes. Hungary
decreased base rates by around 20 % in 2012, after tightening access for additional
adults in a family 2 years earlier. Portugal reformed its minimum income scheme in
August 2010, introducing different equivalence rates. In addition, indexation was
skipped. In Ireland, we observe the combined impact of subsequent cuts to minimum
income benefits and child benefits. The stark decrease of benefits for Italy reflects the
aforementioned decreases in both the actually awarded benefits in Milan and the tight-
ened generosity of the regional housing allowance scheme. The decrease of net income
packages in Romania is caused by the combination of various retrenchment measures
that tightened access to the minimum income benefit and skipped indexation, rather
than by the reform described in Table 4.
Fig. 2 Trends in net disposable income of a household relying on minimum income benefits, average over
four family types, June 2009–January 2012. Note: CY, DK, ES, MT: n.a. No minimum income schemes in EL.
Source: CSB-MIPI Version 3/2013 (Van Mechelen et al. 2011). HICP and poverty thresholds taken from Eurostat (2015)
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Table 4 Reforms implemented since the onset of the crisis (up to start 2012)
Hungary (2009)
The 2009 Hungarian reform (adopted by the parliament on December 15th 2008) aimed to help long-term
unemployed re-enter the labour market (Frey 2011). Therefore, it distinguished between two groups of minimum
income beneficiaries, the frail and those able to work. A new benefit was installed for the group deemed able to work,
the ‘stand by allowance’. The other group remained eligible for regular social assistance. The new stand by allowance
is an individual benefit for each eligible adult, regardless of family composition. The individual benefits were higher,
whereas work and activity conditions were severely tightened. Moreover, if no jobs are available, (remunerated)
community work is offered. The stand by allowance is only payable if no community work can be provided. Since its
introduction in 2009, this new scheme was changed on multiple occasions. For instance, from 2010 onwards, only one
adult per household was eligible for the stand by allowance. Later, the name of the social assistance benefit changed
to ‘wage subsidizing benefit’ and again to ‘employment substitute support’, combined with new activity requirements.
In January 2012, the standard rate of the benefit was reduced by 20 %.
France (2009)
The introduction of the Revenue de Solidarité Active (replacing the former Revenu Minimum d’Insertion and the
Allocation de Parent Isolé) aimed to increase work incentives, and to make sure that taking up employment would be
financially rewarded. An important element in this respect was the introduction of an earnings disregard of 62 % in
the calculation of the new minimum income benefit. In addition, the reform introduced more activation efforts.
Portugal (2010/2011)
The Portuguese reform aimed for a more efficient and effective minimum income scheme (but see Rodrigues 2012).
Meanwhile, a number of elements of the reform can be identified as austerity measures necessitated by the crisis
context. The main measures include an extension of the income and household concept used for the means test and
new (and less generous) equivalence rates. In addition, the complementary support awarded for specific needs was
abolished. The conditionality of the minimum income benefit was tightened. Harsher sanctions were introduced, as
well as a number of anti-fraud measures (for instance, a false claim excludes one from any means-tested benefit for a
2-year period).
Austria (2010)
The Austrian reform aimed to reduce the differences between the different regional minimum income schemes. An
explicit aim was that no beneficiary would lose because of this harmonization. Viennese recipients saw their net
income package in fact substantially increase. Main preoccupation was a harmonization of minimum rates and of
access conditions. In addition, the reform aimed to facilitate the activation of minimum income beneficiaries by
increasing access to public employment services for minimum income recipients.
Netherlands (2012)
The Dutch reform of the minimum income scheme aimed to increase the conditions tied to benefit receipt. Main
justifications of the reform were increasing deficits because of the economic crisis, and the perceived need to increase
work incentives (Rijksoverheid 2011). The increased conditionality targeted different groups, most importantly lone
parents, young jobseekers and artists. In addition, municipalities became entitled to ask for services in return for
benefit receipt, even if this did not directly improve prospects for finding employment. The reform also widened the
household concept for the means test, yet this measure was revoked a few months later.
Lithuania (2012)
The 2012 changes to the Lithuanian minimum income scheme aimed to make social assistance more effective and
just. In addition, work incentives were strengthened. The main changes were to facilitate access to the minimum
income scheme, by abolishing the requirement to be a registered unemployed for 6 months prior to being eligible
for social assistance. Equivalence scales were adapted, with higher benefit levels for the first member of the family,
and lower for the remaining family members. Benefit levels are gradually reduced for long-term beneficiaries. For
beneficiaries without children, the benefit can be suspended after 60 months. Former beneficiaries who take up low
paid employment can continue to receive part of their benefit as a back to work bonus.
Romania (2012)
Romania introduced a new law on social assistance in 2011 that changed the calculation of minimum income
benefits. The benefit levels are from 2012 onwards based on a national reference indicator. Although this will
probably result in lower benefits in the longer run, the immediate impact is relatively limited. The aim of the
reform is to better target social benefits, and to rationalize (decrease) social expenses. The new law was only
partially justified on grounds of the financial crisis.
Slovenia (2012)
The Slovenian reform was already legislated in summer 2010, but due to the crisis actual implementation was delayed
until 2012. The changes addressed both the work incentives in the minimum income scheme, as the streamlining of
the awarding of means-tested benefits. One of the consequences was a tighter means test (for instance, child benefits
are included in the means test, a change that is not completely compensated by the 10 % increase in children’s base
rates within the minimum income benefit). Also, the definition of a lone parent family was tightened. The reform
introduced new equivalence rates that take account of the work effort of beneficiaries. Moreover, the 2010 legislation
foresaw a higher standard rate, but due to the crisis, the envisaged increase was only partially implemented.
Source: CSB-MIPI Version 3/2013 (Van Mechelen 2011)
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In Bulgaria, a nominal standstill since January 2009 resulted in rather substantial real
decreases of net income packages. In a large number of countries, we observe a limited
real decrease of the net income package in this two and a half-year period. These minor
real losses seem to be related to the skipping of indexation, the inadequacy of the in-
dexation mechanism or both.
On the other hand, we see rather stark improvements in Finland, Austria and
Estonia. This is mainly due to uprating gross benefit levels over and above inflation. In
Finland, this is the result of a conscious effort to reinforce the bottom of the welfare
state. In Estonia, the increase occurred after a nominal standstill since the onset of the
crisis, and from a low base. The Austrian increase is mainly due to the 2010 reform
that raised benefit levels for Viennese beneficiaries.
All in all, bar a number of important exceptions at either side of the spectrum, in the
brunt of countries minimum income protection beneficiaries only experienced rather
limited real decreases. This is partially because of the time frame, that does not include
some of the expansionary measures introduced at the start of 2009 and only covers two
and a half years, partly because some measures (e.g. changing indexation mechanisms
in Germany and the United Kingdom, different calculation methods in Romania) will
only reveal their full impact in the longer run, partly because changes were not quite
that pronounced in a number of countries (at least not for these particular family types)
and partly because the average obfuscates the impact of some policy changes on a lim-
ited number of family types.
Figure 3 illustrates the varying impact of some of these policy changes to families
with and families without children. Especially in Hungary, families without children
were most severely hit by the policy change that only one adult per family is entitled to
social assistance for able-bodied persons of working age. In addition, they also suffered
from the 2012 decrease of the minimum income benefit. For the other family types, this
has been partially cushioned by protective clauses for children.
For singles and couples with two children aged 7 and 14, we notice the harsh impact
of the new equivalence rates in Lithuania, Slovenia and to a more limited extent also in
Portugal. In all three countries, larger families experienced larger real decreases than
childless singles or couples. In Romania, the inclusion of the means-tested child benefit
in the means test has important consequences, causing a real drop of over 20 % in net
disposable income for families with children, as opposed to a real decrease of 7 % for
couples without children. In Sweden on the other hand, benefit rates for children in-
creased rather substantially in order to bring legislation in line with changes in the
housing allowance scheme.
5 Discussion
How does this all add up? Figure 4 shows the number of countries implementing posi-
tive and/or negative measures in the period 2008–start 2012. We see a shift from an
emphasis on positive measures in 2008 and 2009 to a focus on more negative measures
in a substantial number of countries from 2010 onwards.
This pattern is more pronounced for some aspects of social citizenship than for
others and especially outspoken for changes to the standard rates of minimum income
benefits (MIP in Fig. 4). Whereas declines in standard rates are virtually absent in 2008
and 2009, nine countries issue increases in 2009. To some extent, this is in countries
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where an adequate indexation mechanism is lacking, but also other countries chose to
increase gross benefits over and above indexation. Later on, these additional increases
become rare. In addition, from 2010 onwards, more and more countries take measures
that have a negative impact on minimum income benefits.
Also additional allowances were increased in the first crisis years. Often, these were
increases of child-related benefits, or actual one-off crisis premiums. Again from 2010
onwards, additional increases become less common and (some) negative measures start
to appear.
Fig. 3 Real trends in net disposable income of a household relying on minimum income benefits, averages
of family types with and without children, June 2009–January 2012. Note: see note to Fig. 2. Source: CSB-
MIPI Version 3/2013(Van Mechelen et al. 2011), HICP from Eurostat (2015)
Fig. 4 Number of countries implementing positive/negative changes affecting minimum income
beneficiaries in the period 2008–start 2012. Source: CSB-MIPI Version 3/2013 (Van Mechelen et al. 2011)
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The pattern is somewhat different for access conditions. It seems that only rarely
governments sought to pursue an expansionary policy by increasing the pool of pos-
sible beneficiaries of minimum income benefits or relevant additional allowances. Some
countries did tighten access conditions to additional benefits or the minimum income
protection scheme as part of an austerity strategy from 2009 and 2010 onwards. It is
however not very clear what the impact is on the pool of eligible persons.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows that changes to behavioural conditionality related to minimum
income receipt do not follow this expansion-retrenchment pattern at all. This is mainly
because crisis measures generally did not impact on conditionality. Governments did
increase investments in activation programs, but the actual conditions tied to minimum
income receipt were mainly left unchanged by crisis responses. Measures that were pre-
pared before the onset of the crisis were however implemented. In line with trends
prior to the crisis (Weishaupt 2013), these measures generally tightened conditionality.
Interestingly, most of the negative changes introduced in the period 2008–start 2012
are technical in nature. This is most clearly seen in the changes to MIP standard rates
from 2010 onwards. Whereas the positive changes in 2009 were increases of standard
rates, actual nominal decreases are very rare. Rather, governments introduced measures
such as the skipping of indexation for inflation, changing the indexation mechanism or
the introduction of a benefit cap. When nominal benefit rates did decrease, this was
generally in the context of broad reforms that introduced new equivalence rates with
different consequences for particular family types. In this regard, it is also noteworthy
that the rather technical and invisible access conditions were often not loosened in the
first crisis, yet they were tightened in a number of countries from 2009 onwards.
Our findings contribute to a number of additional issues raised in the literature. For
one, it is clear that the small increases observed right after the onset of the crisis did
not translate in higher minimum income protection packages. In fact, the austerity
tide—although perhaps less severely than feared—has impacted on minimum income
schemes in quite a number of countries. In order to shed light on theoretical questions
whether minimum income schemes are more vulnerable to these retrenchment mea-
sures than contributory-based income replacement schemes (Korpi and Palme 1998;
Pierson 1994; Nelson 2007), a more complete comparison to changes in unemployment
insurance schemes would be needed.
Second, Figs. 2 and 3 show a wide variation in the size (and direction) of changes to
the generosity of social floors. Whereas a study of the determinants of the direction of
crisis-induced change is outside the scope of this article, a cursory reading of Fig. 2
does seem to corroborate findings by Shahidi (2015) and Armingeon (2012) on the
primacy of fiscal considerations over and above ‘traditional’ explanations, such as the
left-right inclination of the government and institutional factors. We do indeed observe
the largest decreases in countries where the crisis has hit hard, most importantly
Ireland, Portugal, Hungary and Italy. Yet there are some exceptions, and in future
research, we aim to look further into the combination of factors explaining variation in
crisis and austerity reactions in the field of minimum income protection.
Third, a number of authors have raised the question whether crisis-induced change
opens up a window of opportunity to change the course of path-trapped social security
schemes (Starke et al. 2013; Castles 2010). Our focus on minimum income schemes,
that are relatively easy to alter, does not allow us to derive stark conclusions regarding
Marchal et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:4 Page 16 of 20
this conjecture. Nonetheless, most measures that affected social citizenship taken after
the onset of the crisis were rather incremental. Potentially some of the austerity mea-
sures implemented from 2010 onwards will in the longer run substantially impact on
the final safety net. For instance, changing indexation parameters will likely result in
less generous benefits (Joyce and Levell 2011). Some countries did introduce measures
coined by respondents or national sources as reforms. A rather common characteristic
of these reforms is their focus on increasing conditionality and financial work incen-
tives. This focus does not seem out of line with the pre-crisis trend towards increased
conditionality and activation efforts (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008; Weishaupt 2013).
Yet other reform measures, especially changing equivalence scales and tightened access
criteria, generally introduce rather profound changes with regard to the other social
citizenship dimensions presented above. It remains however difficult to assess whether
these changes were triggered by the crisis or not.
6 Conclusions
Social safety net provisions in Europe had generally suffered two decades of relative
neglect and erosion prior to the crisis, legitimized by the idea that work and not welfare
was the best protection against poverty. The result was that minimum income protec-
tion levels were at levels considerably below widely used adequacy benchmarks, includ-
ing the EU’s own 60 % of national median equivalent disposable income threshold.
The crisis smashed the notion that people capable for work ought to be able to make
a decent living if they are doing enough to find and accept work. The initial phase of
the crisis did indeed trigger some changes for the better—expansionary and supportive
measures were the general pattern. But as this paper shows, these changes proved
short-lived. Retrenchment measures become evident later on in a substantial number
of countries. Whereas the expansionary measures observed in the first crisis years gen-
erally centred on increases in benefits, retrenchment measures were more often
enacted through more technical changes. Examples include as follows: skipping
indexation, tightening the means test, abolishment or decrease of additional benefits
(for instance child benefits). Few countries actually cut minimum income benefits.
Moreover, with the exception of Hungary and Ireland, cuts were mainly part of a more
encompassing reform that changed base rates as well as equivalence rates. This is
broadly in line with the retrenchment literature where it is argued that retrenchment is
often pursued through less visible, apparently technical changes.
The long-term impact of these technical changes is hard to predict. For now, time
series and standard simulations of changes in net disposable income packages show
relatively modest impacts in the period 2009–2012. Yet some of the technical changes
may carry the seeds for an incremental path departing process, such as new, less gener-
ous indexation mechanisms or different equivalence scales. These changes may have
far-reaching implications in the longer run, although their immediate impact is rather
modest, not in the least because they may impact on the notion of what a social floor
should actually entail. Nonetheless, in some countries, such as Hungary, Italy, Portugal
and Romania, the combined effect of various retrenchment measures already now
weighs heavily on minimum income beneficiaries.
An important common denominator of the reforms enacted in the wake of the crisis
was the attention to behavioural conditionality requirements. This focus reaffirms a
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policy trend apparent in the pre-crisis years, but in a largely different macro-economic
context.
An open question for further research is how this focus on activation will impact on
the situation of minimum income recipients in a context that starkly differs from the
pre-crisis employment high.
This is all the more relevant as we possibly have not yet seen the end of retrench-
ment in social protection schemes in Europe. The UK government for example recently
announced cuts to the Universal Credit—the main income protection scheme for able-
bodied persons of working age, be it in or out of work. Budgetary concerns where a
stated motive. Similarly, only a couple of months after the implementation of the Por-
tuguese 2010/2011 reform, the Portuguese government implemented a further tighten-
ing of equivalence scales within the minimum income scheme. Other countries have
announced changed to minimum income schemes. In this regard, the description of
policy reforms provided in this article, may serve as a cautionary tale: the common de-
nominator of most reforms were an increased focus on activity requirements, coupled
to a focus on savings and stricter equivalence scales.
The obvious fact that minimum income schemes are considered a viable target for
austerity measures by national governments is all the more disquieting as social floors
within the EU were largely below the poverty threshold to begin with. This stands in
stark contrast to the calls by both the European Commission (2008) and the Inter-
national Labour Organization to ensure adequate social floors (International Labour
Organization, 2012). Whereas the continued focus on work incentives and activity re-
quirements by the national governments could to some extent be considered in line
with these organizations’ concern about well-functioning labour markets and un-
employment, the inadequate benefit levels and restricted access conditions are not.
Endnotes
1EU27 excluding Cyprus and Malta. No information available for Denmark. In
Greece, no minimum income scheme for the able bodied of working age currently
exists.
2More in particular, standard simulations cover the income situation of a single, a
couple, a couple or a lone parent with two children aged 7 and 4, and a lone parent
with a young child.
3A list of the names of the benefit schemes covered is provided in Van Mechelen and
Marchal (2013).
4Both the Slovenian as the Czech activation-related changes to minimum income
benefits were already included under changes in minimum income benefits.
5A 35-year old able-bodied single minimum income recipient, no own income; couple
without children, couple with two children, aged 7 and 14; lone parent with two chil-
dren, aged 7 and 14.
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